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Abstract 
How we recognize the goals of others is a critical question for those interested 
in social, cognitive, and linguistic development. The origins of goal understanding 
exist early in life—that is, infants recognize the intentional relations (e.g., between 
actor and goal) that underlie intentional actions. In this article, I propose one 
mechanism through which these initially narrow goal representations can be 
generalized: comparison. I briefly review evidence that comparison facilitates 
detection of relational similarities across several domains, then address theoretical 
and neural findings consistent with the notion that comparison plays a role in 
social-cognitive development. I discuss more direct evidence that infants can and 
do expand their recognition of others’ goals through comparison and then propose 
several hypotheses concerning the ways in which the benefits of comparison (and 
facilitative cues to compare) may influence the generalization of action 
understanding throughout development. 
Social interactions drive learning and development across a variety of 
domains. We learn from and about others by observing and engaging with them. 
Recognizing others’ goals and intentions is critical to this learning. Intentional 
relations, the links between actors and their goals, underlie and define intentional 
actions and are critical to recognizing the goals of others’ actions (Barresi & 
Moore, 1996). Goal recognition begins early in development: Six-month-olds 
recognize the relation between an actor and the object for which she reaches as 
measured in a habituation paradigm (see Figure 1A; Woodward, 1998). By seven 
months, infants can act on this knowledge and imitate the choice of a reaching 
action by choosing the same toy as an experimenter in an imitation paradigm 
(Hamlin, Hallinan, & Woodward, 2008). And at 11 months, infants anticipate the 
target of intentional relations by looking to the expected goal (object) of a reach 
before the action occurs (Cannon & Woodward, 2012). Across these paradigms, 
infants’ analysis of intentional relations is specific to the well-formed actions of 
agents. Infants recognize the intentional relations inherent in actions that involve 
using tools (Biro & Leslie, 2007; Jovanovic et al., 2007; Sommerville & 
Woodward, 2005) and anticipate goals in multistep sequences (Gredebäck & 
Kochukhova, 2010) later than they understand one-step instrumental actions such 
as grasps. Together, these findings suggest a broadening of infants’ capacity to 
detect the intentional relations in various actions produced by humans across 
development (see Woodward et al., 2009 for a summary) and raise a question: 
What are the developmental origins and the generalization mechanisms involved in 
broadening infants’ capacity to apprehend the intentional structure of human 
actions? 
One source of insight into intentional relations comes from infants’ own 
actions. For example, 3-month-olds are not yet proficient at producing efficient 
object-directed reaches wherein they direct their actions toward an object and 
retrieve it. When 3-month-olds are given Velcro mittens to play with Velcro-
covered toys, they produce more efficient, object-directed reaches. This exercise 
affects infants’ perception of people (attention to faces; Libertus & Needham, 
2011), events (causal perception; Rakison & Krogh, 2012), and intentional 
relations (Sommerville et al., 2005; Figure 1). Active training has yielded similar 
effects for means-end actions at 8 and 10 months (Gerson et al., under review; 
Sommerville, Hildebrand, & Crane, 2008). Neural evidence for the link between 
action production and perception is also growing. Shared neurocognitive 
representations (mirror systems) indicate that motor areas of the brain are activated 
both when a person produces and observes a motorically familiar, goal-directed 
action (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004).  
Both behavioral and neural evidence highlight the role of one’s specific 
motor repertoire in the perception of others’ goal-directed actions. For example, 
individual differences in pointing are related to recognizing pointing, but not gaze, 
as object directed (Brune & Woodward, 2007). The question of how we move 
beyond these initial ties is not negligible. However, the problem of generalization 
is not unique to this domain. Across a variety of fields, spanning verb learning to 
science education, specificity can sometimes be helpful and informative (e.g., the 
past tense of run is not runned), but it can also be limiting if never extended. In the 
domain of intention understanding, we must come to recognize the goals of actions 
we have never produced ourselves; generalization can help when applied 
appropriately (e.g., recognizing common goals across varying physical 
manifestations).  
In studies of primates (e.g., Ferrari, Rozzi, & Fogassi, 2005) and aplasic 
patients (e.g., Gazzola et al., 2007), under certain circumstances, the mirror system 
is recruited when people observe actions that they have not produced. Monkeys 
who had never acted with tools themselves but retrieved food from tools using 
their hands (during daily feeding routines) later evidenced neural activity in the 
monkey ventral premotor area F5when observing actions carried out with tools 
(Ferrari et al., 2005). One explanation for this finding is that the motor system 
adapted to the tool-use action through purely visual familiarity. Alternatively, the 
co-occurrence of the monkey’s grasping action (a motorically familiar action) and 
the tool action (a motorically unfamiliar action) during feeding may have provided 
an opportunity for the motor system to adapt to a broader array of actions--shifting 
from responses to the hand reach alone to both the hand and the tool-use actions. 
Such simultaneous perception of actions that babies have seen but not yet produced 
may play an important role in the generalizing intention understanding. 
Comparison as a Mechanism of Change 
Comparison, a domain-general mechanism that aids recognition of relational 
similarities across exemplars, may provide an avenue through which intentional 
relations can be generalized. Structure mapping, the mapping of relational 
similarities between exemplars, may occur via comparison processes and may 
facilitate the creation of inferences based on relational similarities (Gentner, 2003). 
The influence of comparison on adults’ and preschoolers’ identifying matching 
relations has been shown in domains of spatial representations (Loewenstein & 
Gentner, 2005), verb learning (Childers, 2011), and problem solving (Rittle-
Johnson & Star, 2009). For example, when 3-year-olds played a hiding game in 
which they needed to map a spatial relation (e.g., the bone is under the chair next 
to the bed) from one exemplar to another, they were more proficient at extending 
the relation to a new scenario when they first compared two exemplars side by side 
(Loewenstein & Gentner, 2005; see Figure 2A). In the domain of intention 
understanding, interactions with others provide rich opportunities to compare the 
intentional relations structuring our own and others’ actions, and allow us to seek 
out similarities between them. Joint actions, in which two people act on a common 
goal, are one case in which comparing the intentional relations in two peoples’ 
actions could facilitate intention understanding.  
Comparison may similarly support learning during infancy. For example, in 
one study (Oakes & Ribar, 2005), infants were shown exemplars of a category 
(i.e., dogs and cats) either simultaneously or sequentially. Categorical extension 
was then tested in a paired comparison task. The 4-month-olds in the study 
detected the categorical information when exemplars from familiarization were 
presented simultaneously but not when presented sequentially. The young infants 
could compare simultaneously presented exemplars and abstract relevant 
information from these exemplars (see also Casasola, 2005; Pruden, Hirsh-Pasek, 
Maguire, & Meyer, 2004; Figure 2B).  
Comparison in the Action Domain 
Across a variety of perspectives concerning the emergence of intention 
understanding, a common theme is that comparisons between self and other 
support recognition of others’ intentional actions. For example, the “like me” 
hypothesis (Meltzoff, 2005) suggests that the bodily mapping between an infant’s 
actions and the actions of others provides the basis for extending knowledge about 
the self to others, and vice versa. Moreover, infants may learn about others’ 
intentions via analogy to their own intentional states (Tomasello, 1999). Despite 
these views, the role and nature of comparison processes in the domain of intention 
understanding has not been examined empirically in infants.  
 Imitation is important in understanding others’ intentions because it may 
facilitate comparison between one’s own and another’s goals (Meltzoff, 2005). In 
addition, comparison during the physical alignment of one’s own and others’ 
actions during joint attention allows infants to form an analogy between self and 
other (Barresi & Moore, 1996). In shared attention, the infant’s action and 
attentional state co-occur with the actions and attentional states of another 
individual; the infant can compare these states and infer that the other likely 
possesses attentional and intentional states that are similar to his or her own . 
However, joint attention is not the only context in which infants’ and others’ 
intentions are aligned. Alignment of one’s own and others’ actions could occur 
while acting on an object at the same time as another individual or engaging in a 
joint action with another; these scenarios may provide opportunities for 
comparison (see Reddy, Markova, & Wallot, 2013).  
The benefits of comparison during simple joint actions have been examined 
using tool-use actions (Gerson & Woodward, 2012). Between 6 and 12 months, 
infants grasp objects, but do not use tools to achieve goals (e.g., as a means to 
retrieve another object; Sommerville & Woodward, 2005). Similarly, at these ages, 
infants recognize the relation between a person and her goal in a reaching action, 
but do not recognize the goal of another person’s tool use without extra cues or 
training (Biro & Leslie, 2007; Sommerville & Woodward, 2005). Woodward and I 
hypothesized that allowing infants to compare simultaneously produced grasping 
and tool-use actions would help them discern the similar intentional -relation 
(between actor and goal object) between the two actions. We assessed this 
possibility in a goal imitation paradigm.  
In one study, 7-month-olds were familiarized with a set of toys, an 
experimenter, and a tool in one of several ways. In the critical case (alignment 
condition), infants reached for a toy at the same time the experimenter held the toy 
with a tool (see Figure 3A). In this way, infants could simultaneously perceive the 
familiar action they produced (the grasp) and the unfamiliar (tool-use) action 
produced by the experimenter. In the familiarization period of the control 
conditions, infants were given information about either the association between the 
tool and toys for which they reached or the functional properties of the tool, as 
both of these have been hypothesized to facilitate goal analysis (e.g., Biro & 
Leslie, 2007; see Figure 3D).  
After familiarization, we assessed whether infants viewed the experimenter’s 
tool-use actions as directed to a goal, using a method that assessed infants’ 
propensity to imitate the goals of others’ actions. Infants saw an experimenter act 
on one of two toys (see Figure 3C) and were then given a chance to choose a toy 
themselves. In previous studies (e.g., Hamlin et al., 2008), 7-month-olds imitated 
the experimenter’s toy choice (goal) when the experimenter previously acted on 
her goal in a manner the infant recognized as goal-directed (e.g., grasping) but not 
when she acted on it in an unfamiliar manner (e.g., touching with back of hand). In 
the current study, we expected that infants would imitate the experimenter’s tool-
use action if they recognized the intention of her action but would choose 
randomly if they did not. Only infants in the alignment condition chose the same 
toy as the experimenter more often than would be expected by chance (see Figure 
3D). Lack of imitation in the control conditions, despite similar attentional patterns 
across all conditions, suggests that associations between the toys and tool, attention 
to the two toys, and functional information about the tool were insufficient to lead 
to imitation. Thus, without any experience using the tool, infants were able to 
discern the goal of the experimenter’s tool-use action by comparing their own goal 
when grasping and the experimenter’s goal when using a tool. 
Implications of the Comparison Process in the Action Domain 
The proposed perspective leads to several hypotheses concerning the 
emergence of action understanding and the mechanisms that facilitate this process. 
For example, the relational information to be transferred must be known for one of 
the exemplars being compared for the exemplar to be used as a basis of 
comparison (Gentner, 1988). Thus, active experience may act as a base for moving 
beyond initially context-specific intentional-relations. That is, initial active 
experience may create portable knowledge about intentional-relations that can then 
be applied to new contexts via comparison. In the work described previously 
(Gerson & Woodward, 2012), being able to produce and understand the goal of the 
grasping action was necessary for infants to benefit from comparing this action 
with the novel tool-use action.  
Additional indirect evidence for the hypothesis that active experience may 
act as a base of comparison comes from the studies that used Velcro mittens with 
3-month-olds. When the infants played with toys without mittens and then 
observed mittened actions produced by an experimenter, infants did not later 
recognize the goal of an actor’s mittened grasping action. However, infants who 
produced more unmittened object-directed activity prior to watching the mittened 
adult were more likely than their less active peers to later recognize the goal of the 
mittened action (Gerson & Woodward, under review). Unmittened activity was 
unrelated to goal recognition for infants who did not see the mittened adult’s 
actions. Infants who were more proficient at acting without mittens may have used 
their initial representation about the intentional relations of grasps (gained through 
active experience) to compare their unmittened actions with the mittened actions 
seen during observational training and to extend their recognition of the intentional 
relation during the unmittened portion to the observed mittened actions. Research 
should examine whether this mechanism can and does play a direct role in 
extending information about intentional relations to new contexts. 
Perceptual similarity facilitates comparing and detecting relational 
similarities between exemplars (Gentner, 1988). Thus, comparison of perceptually 
similar objects and actions may facilitate recognition of a broader array of 
intentional relations independent of the particular compared objects. Similarity in 
perceptual features (i.e., matched objects/tools) helps infants compare relations 
between objects and tools across time, and facilitates efficient production of 
multistep actions. For example, perceptually matched tools or toys helped 10-
month-olds transfer problem-solving solutions across multiple exemplars (Chen, 
Sanchez, & Campbell, 1997; see also Gerson & Woodward, 2013a). Whether this 
is also true for action perception has yet to be directly tested. However, additional 
findings from mittens training with 3-month-olds support this hypothesis. When 
infants in another mittens training study saw different objects in the habituation 
paradigm (a bear and ball) than those they had acted on during training (a smiley 
face and box), they did not, as a group, benefit from active training. However, as in 
the observational condition of the Gerson and Woodward (2013) study, the amount 
of unmittened activity produced with the smiley and box was related to individual 
differences in perceiving the goal-agent relation in the grasping action with the 
bear and ball (Gerson & Woodward, unpublished data). Again, comparison 
between the unmittened and mittened actions (with the smiley and box toys) may 
have helped infants detect the intentional-relation independent of the specific 
objects involved (allowing infants to extend this relation from mittened reaches for 
boxes and smileys to mittened reaches for bears and balls). 
Until now, comparison was most frequently studied in domains requiring 
comparison of two external exemplars (e.g., spatial relations of two rooms). In 
contrast, comparison in the social-cognitive domain emphasizes comparisons 
between oneself and another. For example, in the study described previously 
(Gerson & Woodward, 2012), 7-month-olds compared their own action (and goal) 
with an experimenter’s action (i.e. second-person perspective). Given the 
importance of active experience in action perception, we examined whether 
comparing the tool-use action with a familiar action (grasp) produced by another 
actor would provide the same benefits as comparing the novel action with one’s 
own (familiar) actions (see Figure 3B; Gerson & Woodward, 2013b). Ten-month-
old infants initially benefited from engaging in but not from observing alignment 
(as measured through imitation). To examine whether cues that facilitate 
comparison in other domains play a similar role in the domain of intention 
understanding, we conducted the observational condition again, but with labels 
(e.g., Loewenstein & Gentner, 2005; Pruden et al., 2004). When infants saw the 
two actors reach for each toy (using a hand grasp or a tool), they also heard both 
actors use the same label to identify their goal. Woodward and I hypothesized that 
this labeling would lead to increased attention to the relevant aspects of the aligned 
actions (i.e., the relation between the actors and their common goal) and facilitate 
recognition of the similar intentional relations. Infants imitated the experimenter’s 
goals after observing the labeled alignment, consistent with work showing that 
labels facilitate comparison across exemplars (e.g., Fulkerson & Waxman, 2006). 
Thus, early support for comparison processes can take many forms: in 
simultaneous (vs. successive) presentation of exemplars, in active (vs. 
observational) engagement in the interaction, and in labels that promote 
comparison of the relevant aspects. 
Comparison between intentional relations is one mechanism through which 
understanding of initial intention can be generalized. Comparison processes likely 
interact and work in parallel with a variety of other mechanisms throughout 
development. For example, statistical learning (Baldwin & Baird, 2001), language 
development (Astington & Baird, 2005), and explicit explanations are likely 
integrated with these processes in many ways. Furthermore, in this review, I 
focused on the broadening of intention understanding for specifically human 
actions. How this hypothesis can be integrated with findings suggesting ascription 
of intentionality to a broad array of agents early in life remains unanswered (e.g., 
Hamlin, 2013; Luo, 2011). 
To uncover the intricacies of the role of comparison processes in intention 
understanding, research should examine the particular aspects of social interactions 
that are critical to learning and generalization, the role language plays in the 
development of intentional action knowledge, as well as how and when active and 
observational experience interact in development. Opportunities for comparison 
between the child’s own and others’ goals are ubiquitous in children’s lives. 
Children’s interactions with others through observation, joint attention, joint 
action, and shared activities provide rich opportunities to learn about others and 
their intentions throughout development. 
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 Figure 1. (A) In Gerson & Woodward (in press), infants were habituated to a hand 
reaching for and grasping one of two objects. In test trials, the placement of the 
objects was switched and the hand reached for the same toy in a new place (old-
goal trials) or a new goal in the same place (new-goal trials). Both this study and 
Sommerville et al. (2005) used the same habituation procedure (adapted from 
Woodward, 1998). (B) Infants in Gerson & Woodward (in press) received either 
active or observational training. 
    
 
Figure 2. (A) In Loewenstein & Gentner’s (2005) experiments, children compared 
different model rooms with similar relations to extract the spatial relation of the 
bone under the table. (B) In Pruden and colleagues’ (2004) experiments, infants 
recognized the relation over via comparison of different movements following the 
same relational trajectory (over an object). 
 Figure 3. (A) Familiarization of active alignment condition in Gerson & 
Woodward (2012). (B) Observational condition in Gerson & Woodward (2012). 
This was visually identical to the labeling condition in Gerson & Woodward 
(2013). (C) In test trials for each of these studies, infants saw an experimenter 
reach for one of two toys using a claw (demonstration) and then chose between 
two toys themselves (toy choice). (D) In Gerson & Woodward (2012), infants in 
the alignment condition imitated the experimenter’s toy choice at greater than 
chance levels (y-axis: average percentage of test trials on which infants imitated 
the experiment’s toy choice). They were at chance in the three control conditions: 
Control touch (infant could reach for the claw without a toy present), control move 
(infant saw experimenter move each toy with the claw, demonstrating functional 
properties), and control association (infant could reach for each toy held by the 
claw but the experimenter did not hold the other end of the claw). The alignment 
condition was the only case in which infants could compare their own reach for the 
toy with the experimenter’s reach for the toy.  **p < .02, *p < .05. 
 
